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President Donald Trump has for years claimed that Europe was not carrying its share of the defense of Europe. The complaints have apparently been heard, and Europe is stirring itself to spend more on defense. It would be safe to say NATO does not appreciate being called on the carpet for being military deadbeats. Still, it grudgingly admits the accuracy of what Trump has been saying. The following from the BBC is a good example of European consternation:

“He (Trump) simply doesn’t believe in win-win partnerships,” the former German Chancellor Angela Merkel told me. She experienced Trump last time he was in office and concluded he views the world through the prism of winners and losers.

He’s convinced that Europe has taken advantage of the US for years and that’s got to stop.

Leaders in Europe have watched open-mouthed these last weeks since Trump won the US presidential election, for the second time. He’s chosen to publicly lambast allies in Europe and Canada, rather than focus his ire on those he recognises as a strategic threat, like China.

Trump dangles the possibility of abandoning Nato – the transatlantic military alliance that Europe has relied on for its security for decades. He has said he’d “encourage” Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” with European allies if they “don’t pay” their way more and boost their defence spending.

Notice that Europe considers China a threat, but instead of self-reflection, they automatically default to the US, which should pay attention to that, not Europe. You would think Europe should think outside its own little box and consider all threats to its security.

So, yes, Trump, in his bombastic style, has been pressuring Europe to spend more on its defense. The question is not the manner of his requests so much as whether he is correct in his assessment of them. Has Europe been paying its fair share of the common defense or not?

There are several ways to measure military contribution.  One way is the percentage each country in NATO contributes to the total pie.  But that is not a very good measure because a small country like Estonia can’t contribute as much as Germany or France.  So, most feel a measure of defense expenditure against the size of a nation’s GDP is better.  That tells you if, given their size, they are stepping up or not.

NATO has been under pressure from Trump and has formulated a policy requiring each nation to spend 2% of its GDP on defense.  That number seems entirely arbitrary, but it is a start.  You would think nations concerned about their security might spend more than that.

Then, there is the issue of what is spent on NATO per se.  For example, the US contributes about 16% of the forces for NATO, about three times more than the next most significant contributor, Germany. But that is misleading.  If NATO were in trouble, the US would shift military assets from other theatres, such as the Middle East, to assist.  What the US stations in Europe is not necessarily what we would bring to the table in the event of war.  Air, naval, and eventually ground forces would be shifted.

However, in the case of Europe, most of their forces would likely stay in Europe, although Europe did contribute in a small degree to the Afghanistan War.

So, to measure whether nations are contributing, the best overall measure is military expenditures measured against the size of each country’s economy. The following table shows what those contributions were.

NATO Countries’ 2023 Defense Expenditures

You can see who the slackers are. Canada, Belgium, and Germany, in particular, stand out. Some like France and England are getting close to 2%, but as we said earlier, why is that the magic number? Poland does not think 2% is the proper number.  Poland is already near the 4% level, twice what is “required” by the EU, but maybe reality requires more than the EU.

Then, there should be a measure of effective fighting force. For example, being in the armed forces in Belgium is more like a social service job than an army ready to fight. You can intuit that when you learn that the average age for a soldier is 44. If you know numbers, an average of 44 means there are a lot of soldiers older than that! So the amount of money they spend, as puny as it is, does not tell you the whole story.  Military budgets can be padded with quasi-social spending, pensions, and social experimentation that can reduce fighting effectiveness and even unit cohesion.

We don’t mean to single out Belgium, but about 20% of the armed services are female. In Poland, it is about 7%.

Then, there is the decision whether women will be in support or combat arms.  That seems to vary quite a bit, depending on the culture of a particular nation.  What works in Belgium may not work in Turkey, which allows very few women.

Support in war is critical, with troops generally being something like 10 in support for each one in the combat arms. So, we are not disparaging the contribution women can make. However, the effectiveness of large numbers of women in the combat arms can vary, especially in units like artillery, armor, engineering, and the infantry, where upper body strength is helpful. In the West, in general, the combat arms have had to lower physical requirements to get more women.  Combat effectiveness is sacrificed to achieve abstract social goals.

The age of military equipment and its readiness is also a factor. You would hope that in Belgium, the average age of equipment does not match the age of their soldiers, but I could not find that number.

Also important are the physical stores of bullets, bombs, shells, missiles, and vehicles.  There are constant reports of shortages of essential munitions such as 155 mm artillery shells for Ukraine, with Europe taking as much as one year to fill an order. 

Part of defense preparedness is having both the stores and the industrial replacement capability. Since industry can be dual use (both civilian and military), if Europe expects to defend itself, those munitions must be on hand. By the time you crank up production lines,  the invader could have taken over the country.

Ironically, one of the lessons of the Ukraine War is that with nuclear weapons on both sides, the combatants have decided to slug it out in almost World War I fashion, massive artillery duels and cheap drones. This requires both large munitions stores and significant industrial capacity to replace them.

Again, the measure of that capability does not come quickly from a 2% abstract number.

In short, Europe is moving towards the magic 2% of GDP, but who is to say that is enough, and how do we measure fighting effectiveness for the money spent?

As offensive as Trump’s remarks have been to Europeans, Trump was and is correct.  Europe and Canada have shirked their duty.  They should thank him for waking them the hell up.

They are irritated because they have been called out, and they know they have no excuse other than they wanted to spend more money on their welfare state socialism.

Moreover, there is scant evidence that Europe would be doing anything to increase defense spending if President Trump had not constantly urged it. There is some evidence that countries are already playing accounting games to bolster spending by moving money around from other categories.

It will take some time to determine whether Europe is serious about re-arming. The video below is instructive and worth your time.